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Summary
Cultural transmission is a key component of human evolu-
tion. Two of humans’ closest living relatives, chimpanzees
and orangutans, have also been argued to transmit behav-
ioral traditions across generations culturally [1–3], but how
much the process might resemble the human process is still
in large part unknown. One key phenomenon of human
cultural transmission is majority-biased transmission: the
increased likelihood for learners to end up not with the
most frequent behavior but rather with the behavior demon-
strated bymost individuals. Here we show that chimpanzees
and human children as young as 2 years of age, but not
orangutans, are more likely to copy an action performed
by three individuals, once each, than an action performed
by one individual three times. The tendency to acquire the
behaviors of the majority has been posited as key to the
transmission of relatively safe, reliable, and productive
behavioral strategies [4–7] but has not previously been
demonstrated in primates.
Results and Discussion
In many animal species, individuals learn socially from con-
specifics and so carry the potential to ‘‘transmit’’ behaviors
and strategies across generations [8]. Perhaps most strongly,
chimpanzees and orangutans, each of which have behavioral
repertoires that differ among different populations, have
been argued to transmit behaviors culturally [1, 3, 6]. In com-
parison to other great apes, humans seem to transmit many
more types of behaviors, and the behavioral differences
between populations appear to exceed those observed in
other animal species [9]. Much of the prior research attempting
to account for these differences has focused on interspecies
differences in the transmitted content—what is learned
[10–12].
An equally important aspect of social learning is who learns
from whom [13–15]: the social dynamics of social learning
determine, for example, how quickly a behavior might spread
within and between populations and how stably it might be
retained subsequently [4]. Of particular importance in this re-
gard is what we propose to call majority-biased transmission:
the increased likelihood of naı¨ve observers to acquire the
behavior of the majority. In other words, if, due to any combi-
nation of underlying mechanisms, an individual is more likely*Correspondence: haun@eva.mpg.deto acquire the behavior displayed by the majority than other
equifinal alternative behaviors, we refer to it asmajority-biased
transmission.
The majority response is an aggregate response based on
the individual learning efforts of the entire group and therefore
likely safer, more reliable, andmore productive than any single
response [4, 16]. If social learning is adaptive, natural selection
should favor majority-biased transmission, as long as it does
not completely block transmission of rare, high-quality vari-
ants [5–7]. Moreover, majority-biased transmission serves an
important function in the structure of cultural diversity: in
both species, chimpanzees [17] and humans [18, 19], individ-
ualsmigrate across group boundaries. Hence, in both species,
differences between groups should level out over time.
Majority-biased transmission, in theory at least, can prevent
the homogenization of cross-cultural differences [4]. Because
immigrants into the group acquire the majority strategy with a
greater probability than available alternatives, group-specific
behavioral variants are preserved, even when there are high
rates of migration [4, 16]. To stabilize group differences over
time, the probability with which a naive individual will adopt
the majority strategy must at least match the size of the
majority within the population. If the probability to acquire
the majority strategy exceeds the size of the majority within
the population, it is referred to as conformist transmission
[16, 20, 21]. Experimentally, conformist transmission has as
of yet only been demonstrated in shoaling fish [22, 23].
Prior studieswithprimatesdemonstrated thatobservers, out
of two available alternatives to open an artificial fruit, preferen-
tially adopted the strategy that was dominant in their group
[24–30]. In these studies, the behavior performed by the
majority of individuals is almost certainly also the one that ob-
servers saw first and most often. So, we do not know whether
the observing individuals acquired the behavior that they
observed first, most frequently, or the behavior of the majority.
Study 1
In the present study, we investigated majority-biased trans-
mission in human children, chimpanzees, and orangutans.
To investigate whether individuals acquire the strategy of the
majority specifically, and not the most frequently demon-
strated strategy, we independently manipulated the number
of demonstrators while keeping the number of demonstrations
constant across strategies. Sixteen two-year-old human
children (Homo sapiens), 15 chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes),
and 12 Bornean orangutans (Pongo pygmaeus) participated
in this study.
We constructed a box with three differently colored subsec-
tions (Figure 1). In the top of each section was a hole. If a ball
was dropped in one of the holes, an electronic food-dispenser
released a reward out of the bottom of the box. We controlled
which subset of holes had active triggers. Participants, who
had never interacted with the box, observed four familiar
conspecific peers interacting with the box one after the other.
These demonstrators were previously trained to strongly
prefer one of the box’s colored sections. One demonstrator
(the minority) dropped a ball into one of the three colored
sections three times in a row, receiving one piece of food for
Figure 1. Structure of Peer Demonstrations in
Study 1 and Study 2
(A) Demonstrations of different response options
in study 1. One option is demonstrated by three
different individuals, once each (majority). One
option is demonstrated by one individual three
times (minority). One option is never demon-
strated. The real boxes were opaque, not trans-
parent as indicated here. Every observer saw
these two types of demonstrations by conspe-
cific peers in counterbalanced order.
(B) Demonstrations of different response options
in study 2. One option is demonstrated by one
individual three times (frequent). A second option
is demonstrated by one individual once (rare).
One option is never demonstrated. The real
boxes were opaque, not transparent as indicated
here. Every observer saw two demonstrations
by conspecific peers in counterbalanced order.
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728each dropped ball. The three other demonstrators (the
majority), one after the other, all used the same colored section
(different from the minority) once each, receiving one reward
each (Figure 1A). The number of demonstrations was identical
across the two demonstrated solutions (three demonstrations
each), but one was demonstrated by a larger number of
individuals than the other (3 versus 1 peers). The third option
was never demonstrated. Which colored sections were
demonstrated and the order of majority versus minority
demonstrations were counterbalanced across subjects. After
a successful demonstration, themodels were beckoned aside,
to a location where they could watch the observer but could
not interfere. After a 5 min waiting period, the observer was
then allowed access to the box, and the experimenter handed
the observer a ball. After the observers had dropped a ball in
the box, they were handed a second and then a third ball.
Lost balls were replenished until either the participant had
placed three balls in the box or 5min had passed. Six chimpan-
zees did not respond within the allotted time. Observers
received a reward for every ball they dropped in the box. All
responses were recorded on video and coded both in situ
and post hoc. Each response was coded as either copying
the majority (majority response), the minority (minority
response), or neither (other response).
To compare number of choices between response options,
we used a Monte-Carlo approach. We simulated individuals
to match our original subjects with regard to the number of
choices they made, randomly (with replacement) putting balls
into the available options. We then calculated the test-statistic
(Ts) as the sum of the squared differences between the total
numbers of balls per option and the mean number of balls
per option. The p value was then estimated as the proportion
of simulations revealing a test statistic at least as large as
the original one. Usually we used 1,000 simulations, butwhen the p value was close to 0.05 we
used 10,000 to estimate it more accu-
rately. Chimpanzees did not respond
randomly across options (Ts = 165;
p < 0.001; majority: 72%, minority: 0%,
other: 28%; see Figure 2A). We used
the same Monte Carlo approach for
pairwise comparisons between only
two choice options. Here we considered
only the balls that were actually droppedin the two relevant options as the number of choices to be
simulated and considered only the two options to be com-
pared as available. All p values of pairwise comparisons
throughout the manuscript are Bonferroni-Holm corrected
for multiple comparisons. Chimpanzees gave more majority
responses than minority responses (Ts = 162; p < 0.01), more
majority responses than other responses (Ts = 60.5; p <
0.01), and more other responses than minority responses
(Ts = 24.5; p < 0.01). As measured by their most common
response, out of the nine chimpanzees that responded, seven
gave mainly majority responses (Figure 3A).
Children did also not respond randomly (Ts = 242; p < 0.001;
majority: 56.3%,minority: 33.3%, other: 10.4%; see Figure 2A).
They gave more majority responses than minority responses
(Ts = 60.5; p < 0.05), more majority responses than other
responses (Ts = 242; p < 0.01), and more minority responses
than other responses (Ts = 60.5; p < 0.01). As measured by
their most common response, 9 out of 16 children gave mainly
majority responses (Figure 3A).
Orangutans responded randomly across the three response
options (Ts = 2; p = 0.91; majority: 36.1%, minority: 33.3%,
other: 30.6%; see Figures 2A and 3A).
Study 2
In a second study, we investigated whether individuals would
also take frequency information into account when the number
of demonstrators was stable. In contrast to study 1, wemanip-
ulated the number of demonstrations while keeping the
number of demonstrators constant across strategies.
Fourteen 2-year-old human children (Homo sapiens), 14
chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes), and 14 Bornean orangutans
(Pongo pygmaeus) participated in study 2. All participants
had not previously participated in study 1 but were sampled
from the same populations.
Figure 2. Percent Responses following Different Demonstrations in Study 1 and Study 2
(A) Percentage of given responses in either of the three response categories (majority, minority, or other), separately for the three tested great ape species
in study 1.
(B)Percentageofgiven responses ineitherof the three responsecategories (frequent, rare,orother), separately for the three testedgreatapespecies instudy2.
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729The setup of study 2 was identical to study 1, and the pro-
cedure was similar, with one crucial difference: study 2 had
two demonstrators only. One demonstrator (frequent demo)
dropped three balls into one of the three colored sections,
receiving one piece of food for each ball. The second demon-
strator (rare demo) dropped one ball into an alternative section
of the box, receiving one piece in return. The number of
demonstrators was identical (one demonstrator each), but
one section was demonstrated more often than the other
(three versus one demonstrations, see Figure 1B). The third
option was never demonstrated. Each response was coded
as either copying the frequently demonstrated strategy
(frequent response), the infrequently demonstrated strategy
(rare response), or neither (other response).
Chimpanzees distributed their balls randomly across the
three response options (Ts = 14; p = 0.56; frequent: 40.7%,
rare: 22.2%, other: 37%; see Figures 2B and 3B).Figure 3. Number of Individuals following the Different Demonstrations in Stu
(A) Number of individuals in study 1 that either mainly respond following one of
indicating a specific preference.
(B) Number of individuals in study 2 that either mainly respond following one
indicating a specific preference. Color shades in both panels indicate whethe
possible responses following the same strategy.Children did not distribute their balls randomly across
options (Ts = 146; p < 0.01; frequent: 54.8%, rare: 31%, other:
14.3%; see Figure 2B). Children gave more frequent
responses than rare responses (Ts = 50; p < 0.05), more
frequent responses than other responses (Ts = 144.5; p <
0.01), and no more rare responses than other responses
(Ts = 24.5; p = 0.10). As measured by their most common
response, 8 out of 14 children gave mainly frequent responses
(Figure 3B).
Orangutans distributed their balls randomly across the
three response options (Ts = 24; p = 0.48; frequent: 28.6%,
rare: 42.9%, other: 28.6%; see Figures 2B and 3B).
Taking the results of the two studies together, chimpanzees
seemed to consider the number of demonstrators more
strongly than the number of demonstrations when deciding
which information to extract from their social environment.
Children considered both. Orangutans considered neither.dy 1 and Study 2
the three response options (majority, minority, or other), or respond without
of the three response options (frequent, rare, or other) or respond without
r an individual gave three of three (dark shade) or two of three (light shade)
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and chimpanzees both tend to acquire the preference of the
majority when attempting to learn a new skill, supports theo-
retical accounts of human evolution arguing for the prevalence
of majority-biased transmission in social learning [31] and
suggests at least a partial explanation for the stability of
group-specific behavioral differences across neighboring
groups in both species [4].
Although the majority seems to affect social learning in both
human children and chimpanzees, several intriguing questions
remain. For example, because the majority by definition
encompasses most individuals in the group, several different
social learning biases might underlie the transmission pattern
reported here, such as the preference to copy what most
individuals do, what the most prestigious individuals do [32],
what individuals do that are similar to the observer [33],
what the most skilled individuals do [34], or any combination
thereof. The relative importance of these different factors
might of course vary across species and ages, resulting in
majority-biased transmission based on varying, equifinal com-
positions of underlying mechanisms.
Alternatively, the majority-biased transmission observed in
study 1 could also be caused by naı¨ve individuals copying
one demonstrator at random. Future studies should vary
the relative size of the two demonstrator groups: if the prob-
ability with which naive individuals acquire the majority
behavior changes linearly in response to a change of the
relative size of the larger group, random copying is likely.
If, in response to a change of the relative size of the larger
group, the proportion with which naive individuals acquire
the majority behavior changes not linearly but in categor-
ical steps when crossing certain relevant thresholds
(majority (>50%) versus plurality (most common but <50%)
versus minority (not most common) [35]), random copying
is unlikely.
In our study, only chimpanzees showmajority-biased trans-
mission to an extent that could stabilize traits within a popula-
tion across time. Based on our results, we cannot explain the
larger effect in chimpanzees relative to human children, but
we hope it will inspire future investigation.
Finally, it is significant that both human children and chim-
panzees were more likely to acquire the majority behavior,
but orangutans were not. Interestingly, in contrast to both
humans and chimpanzees, Bornean orangutans (the species
studied here) live in an individual fission-fusion social structure
[36], largely excluding options for social learning from (groups
of) other individuals beyond the mother infant dyad. Hence,
the natural social structure of a species might explain, at least
in part, which cues individuals pay attention to when learning
from others.
Focusing on the social dynamics of social learning [13, 15]
allows the investigation of previously unconsidered similarities
and differences across species and exposes the social nature
of cultural transmission and cross-cultural variability.Experimental Procedures
Participants
Study 1
Sixteen 2-year-old human children (Homo sapiens) (10 females, 6 males;
mean age = 2 years 3 months (2;3 years); SD = 2;2 months; range = 2–
2;6 years), 15 chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) (10 females, 5 males; mean
age = 11 years; SD = 5 years; range = 4;6–21 years), and 12 Bornean orang-
utans (Pongo pygmaeus) (6 females, 6 males; mean age = 9 years; SD = 2
years; range = 6;6–12 years) participated in this study.Study 2
Fourteen 2-year-old human children (Homo sapiens) (8 females, 6 males;
mean age = 2;3 years; SD = 2;3 months; range = 2;1–2;6 years), 14 chimpan-
zees (Pan troglodytes) (10 females, 4males; mean age = 12;6 years; SD = 4;4
years; range = 8–19;6 years), and 14Bornean orangutans (Pongo pygmaeus)
(5 females, 9 males; mean age = 7 years; SD = 1;4 years; range = 5;6–
9;6 years) participated in study 2. All participants had not previously partic-
ipated in study 1 but were sampled from the same populations.
All children were recruited from kindergartens in Leipzig, Germany, were
native German speakers of normal ability range, and came from mixed
socioeconomic backgrounds. All chimpanzees were housed at the
Tchimpounga Chimpanzee Sanctuary, Republic of Congo. All orangutans
were housed at the Orangutan Care Centre and Quarantine, Kalimantan,
Indonesia. The presented study was noninvasive and strictly adhered to
the legal requirements of the countries in which it was conducted. The study
was approved by an internal ethics committee at the Max Planck Institute
for Evolutionary Anthropology. Animal husbandry and research complied
with the PASA Primate Veterinary Healthcare Manual and the policies of
Tchimpounga Chimpanzee Sanctuary and the Orangutan Care Centre and
Quarantine. Apes voluntarily participated in the study and were never
food or water deprived.
Materials and Procedure
The Box
The box was attached to the outside of the steel mesh of an observation
room in the case of the chimpanzees and orangutans and placed on the
ground in the case of human children. Rewards were peanuts for chimpan-
zees and orangutans and chocolate drops for human children.
Training
During training, only one of the colored sections released food. Conspecific
demonstrators were trained to strongly prefer one of the three colored
sections of the box. Demonstrators were considered to have adopted
a strong preference and met the criterion to perform as a demonstrator
once they used this assigned color in 10/12 consecutive trials.
Exclusion Criteria
Demonstrations during which the observer was not facing in the direction
of the demonstration were repeated. Trials in which one of the models
would not accurately demonstrate the trained strategy were excluded
and replaced by a new session with a new observer (study 1: chimpanzees,
1; humans, 10; orangutans, 0; study 2: chimpanzees, 10; humans, 2;
orangutans, 0).
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